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Abstract. We propose a light-weight client-server model of communica-
tion between existing implementations of different program analyses. The
communication is on-line and anonymous which means that all analyses
simultaneously analyse the same program and an analysis does not know
what other analyses participate in the communication. The anonymity
and model’s strong emphasis on independence of analyses allow to pre-
serve almost everything in existing implementations. An analysis only
has to add an implementation of a proposed communication protocol,
determine places in its code where information from others would help,
and then check whether there is no communication scenario, which would
corrupt its result. We demonstrate functionality and effectiveness of the
proposed communication model in a detailed case study with three anal-
yses: two abstract interpreters and the classic symbolic execution. Re-
sults of the evaluation on SV-COMP benchmarks show impressive im-
provements in computed invariants and increased counts of successfully
analysed benchmarks.
Keywords: Communication, program analysis, anonymous, online, Apron,
Box, Polka, Symbolic execution.
1 Introduction
Our experience with several program analysis tools suggests that a piece of in-
formation provided to an analysis at a right place may (substantially) improve
its result. Although it is usually not difficult to identify such places (e.g. evalua-
tion of highly over-approximated program operators, like bit-operators, pointer
arithmetic, etc.) a problem is where to get the information. The additional in-
formation may be known to another program analysis.
We propose a light-weight communication model allowing a program analysis
to issue a query to other analyses (analysing the same program in the same time)
for an additional information which might hopefully push it towards to a better
result. The communication is in the style client-server. The server mediates the
communication between individual analyses (clients). Each client performs his
work on his own private data (like internal program representation, memory
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model, etc.). Nevertheless, the communication itself has to be performed in term
all clients understand. Client’s query thus typically begins with a conversion of
his internal data to common terms, and it ends by the opposite conversion.
The proposed communication model is based on the following key features
which together distinguishes our work from previous approaches in the field:
– Independence of clients: Each client implements his communication protocol
without consideration of other clients. This implies that in order to add a
new client into the communication, implementations of all former clients
remain exactly the same, i.e. no line of code has to be changed, added,
or removed. Also, if we have n > 0 clients with their communication code
already established, then code of no client has to be changed in order to run
any of 2n − 1 their possible combinations.
– Asynchronous execution of clients: The communication model casts no re-
quirements for synchronization of computational steps of clients. It means
that some clients may perform forward analysis, other backward, and even
speed in which different clients explore their internal program representa-
tions may differ.
– Reuse of current implementations: The model attempts to preserve both al-
gorithms and related data structures of analyses which clients perform. So,
there is no need for their re-implementations. A client only has to add an
implementation of the communication protocol, determine places in its code
where to use information from others, and check that there is no communi-
cation scenario which would corrupt his results.
An important part of the paper is also the case study, which represents the
first instance of the proposed communication model. There are three clients in
the case study. Two of them perform “intervals” and “polyhedrons” abstract
interpretations [7] and the third is the classic symbolic execution [16]. The de-
scription of the case study in this paper serves as a detailed example. It is meant
to be used as guide for building other instances of the model. The evaluation
of the case study was performed on SV-COMP [26] benchmarks for five combi-
nations of clients. Results of individual combination were compared per client
in terms of strengthened invariants (for abstract interpreters) and impact of the
communication on success/fail termination states (for all clients). Although re-
sults of individual configurations are quite impressive for themselves, we further
observed that each configuration can actually bring as not negligible improve-
ments over others. This opens a new (originally unexpected) application of the
approach: Given n > 0 clients and a program to be analysed, we build as many
combinations from all 2n − 1 as possible (we are only limited by resources, like
number of computers, threads, time, etc.) and we analyse the program for each
of them. Then we merge all results.
We explain the communication model in Sec. 2. We first describe common
terms in which the communication is performed and then we present communi-
cation protocols for clients and the server. The case study is presented in Sec. 3.
It starts with a description of all three clients and the rest is dedicated to a
detailed evaluation.
2
2 Communication model
A client is a program analysis tool or a program analysis inside a tool which
is able to communicate with other clients during analysis of a given program.
A server is a program utility mediating the communication between clients. A
client can only communicate with the server and has no information about other
clients, except their count. Data exchanged between the server and a client are
received in exactly the same order as they are sent. There is a time-out for
whole the communication common to all clients and the server. There is a single
program analysed by all clients.
Given a program written in a certain programming language, a concrete pro-
gram state is an element of the concrete semantics of the language, an abstract
state space is any subset of a client’s interpretation (e.g. abstraction or gener-
alisation) of the semantics of the language, and an abstract program state is an
element of an abstract state space.
Let us suppose a client receives an information from other clients (via the
server) that “at address 1234 there is stored an integer greater than zero”. This
information is useless for the client until it is coupled with the following:
1. An actual value of the instruction counter.
2. A set of program paths (from the program’s entry to the actual instruction
counter) for which the information was inferred.
3. A meaning of the address 1234 in order to map it into a particular address
in client’s representation of program’s memory.
Points 1. and 2. are discussed in Sec. 2.1, the point 3. in Sec. 2.2, and a
concrete structure of the received information in Sec. 2.3. The communication is
described in Sec. 2.3 and 2.4 as client’s and server’s communication protocols.
2.1 Canonical program
Given a program written in a certain programming language, a canonical program
is a model of program’s instruction counter designed and used by clients for
purposes of their communication. Before start of the communication each client
must have his copy of the canonical program.
There is a program representation which is very popular among clients: a
control-flow graph. We present a “default” recipe how clients may build a canon-
ical program from a control-flow graph of an elected client. Clients may later
separate the resulting implementation into a stand-alone utility program.
We assume in the recipe that the input control-flow graph satisfies the fol-
lowing properties (which might require some pre- and/or post-processes of a raw
control-flow graph produced by the client):
– The instruction counter is modeled by nodes and edges represent possible
transitions of the counter during execution of the program.
– Each sub-program is represented by a separate component with a single entry
node and a single exit node.
3
Token idx. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Sample 1 a = 0 ; b = 1 ;
Sample 2 if ( a > 0 ) b = 1 ; else b = 2 ;
Sample 3 if ( a > 0 || a < 10 ) b = 1 ;
Sample 4 for ( i = 0 ; i < 10 ; ++ i ) ++ a ;
Sample 5 if ( a > 0 ) goto L ; ++ a ; L : -- b ;
1,2,3
5,6,7
1,2,3
5,6,7
1,2,3
1,2,3
5,6,7
5,6,7
(a) (b)
3,4,5
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3,4,5 3,4,5
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14,15
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3,4,53,4,5
10,11
15,16
(c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 1. (a) Five C samples and indices of their lexical tokens. (b)-(f) A possible canon-
ical program for samples 1-5 respectively. Labels on edges represent back-mapping of
the input control-flow graph and labels inside nodes represent the labeling in the final
canonical program. Note that (b) shows 2 possible versions of a canonical program.
– The control-flow graph is coupled with a set of all edges representing calls
of sub-programs. Let us denote it “set of calls”.
– The control-flow graph was constructed on a syntactically reshaped version
of the original program, where each lexical token was put into a separate
line. For C programs there are tools available for this functionality including
computation of the back-mapping of lines to the original program [22,23].
This reshaping is used to achieve one-to-one mapping between program lines
and indices of lexical tokens (since these indices may not be directly available
to a client). In Fig. 1 (a) there are five C samples with tokens indexed. In
the reshaped program these indices are equal to program lines.
– The control-flow graph is coupled with a “back-mapping” to the reshaped
source code of the analysed program, which maps each edge to a set of all
those program lines (i.e. lexical tokens) s.t. an effect of the code at those lines
is associated with the edge. It does not imply that index of every program’s
token must appear in the range of the back-mapping. Typically, indices of
tokens whose purpose is captured by the shape of the control-flow graph
(e.g. semicolons, some brackets, keywords like if, else, for, etc.) must not
appear in the back-mapping. Such conventions are dependent on agreement
of clients. We require the back-mapping has the following property: If two
edges have non-empty intersection of their sets of lines, then the edges have
the same head node. Back-mappings for all 5 samples of Fig. 1 (a) are de-
picted in Fig. 1 (b)-(f) as labels of edges. Please, ignore labels of nodes. A
code associated with an edge may consist of one or more statements (e.g. a
sequence of assignments, whole if-then-else statement, or even several
loops). This level of details is given by the input control-flow graph. Of
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course, more detailed control-flow graphs are preferable. For sample 1 we
present at Fig. 1 (b) a detailed version (left) and a coarse one (right).
The recipe proceeds in the following three steps:
1. Discard all labels of all nodes and edges of the control-flow graph.
2. Label each edge in the set of calls as call edge and label each edge with an
out-degree greater then 1 as branching edge.
3. Label each node by a set of indices of program’s lexical tokens. We compute
node’s label as the union of values of the back-mapping function for each
out-edge from the node.
Observe that labels of exit nodes of all sub-programs are necessarily empty.
Now we can define meaning of a node of a canonical program:
A statement that the instruction counter is at a certain node of a canonical
program means that the instruction counter is at the position in the source code
s.t. all lines of an instruction to be executed next belong to the label of the node.
Canonical programs for all five samples of Fig. 1 (a) are depicted in Fig. 1 (b)-
(f) (please ignore labels of edges; labels of branching edges are omitted).
In the remainder of the paper we use the term node as a representation of a
concrete value of the instructions counter in a canonical program. Similarly, we
use the term edge for a possible transition of the counter between nodes. Finally,
we distinguish two kinds of edges: call and branching, with obvious meanings.
Mapping between canonical and internal program representation
Another important purpose of labels of canonical program’s nodes is to allow
individual clients to build a mapping between nodes of the canonical program
and their own internal program representations (on which analyses are actu-
ally performed). A construction of such mapping requires that all clients build
their internal program representations from the reshaped program instead of
the original one. Not all nodes of the canonical program has to appear in the
mapping. Nevertheless, a client should attempt to establish the mapping for as
much nodes as possible, since he may issue communication queries (or provide
a useful information to others) only at nodes with the mapping.
Since labels of nodes of a canonical program partition all tokens of the pro-
gram (possibly expect some auxiliary tokens as mentioned above), clients may
store only incomplete information about program lines in their internal program
representations. This information may differ from client to client. For example,
given a C statement a=0; one client may identify it only by the line of its first
token, i.e. the line of a, another by the line of the last token, i.e. of 0 (or even
of ;), and another by the line of the root operator, i.e. of =. Moreover, client
may perform several equivalent program transformations, e.g. code optimisa-
tions. Consider for example a client which first translates a C program to LLVM
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assembly with several optimisations enabled, and then he builds his internal pro-
gram representation from the optimised assembly. Such transformation typically
reduce information about program lines.
It is very difficult (or impossible) to provide a general algorithm for construc-
tion of such mapping, since internal program representation of a client may be
arbitrary. Here we provide a “default” recipe for construction of the mapping
for clients whose internal program representation has a form of a control-flow
graph in which nodes model the instruction counter:
Let (h, t) be an edge of an internal program representation s.t. there is a
source code line associated with the edge, and let n be a node of the canonical
program containing the line in its label. We extend the mapping in any of the
following three cases:
1. If in-degrees of both n and h are zeros, then link h with n.
2. If t is an exit node and n has a successor with the empty label and with the
out-degree 0, then link t with the successor of n.
3. If all successor edges of t have lines associated and all the lines belong to
the label of a single successors node n′ of the node n and n 6= n′, then link
t with n′.
We demonstrate an application of the recipe in an example depicted in Fig. 2.
Context
A filter is a set of kinds of edges of a canonical program (remember that we
distinguish only two kinds of edges in this presentation). A context is a list of
edges of a canonical program s.t. each edge has a kind which belongs to a given
filter. For example, any context constructed for the filter {call} may contain only
call edges.
A context constructed for a certain filter represents a set of program paths
starting at the program’s entry node. A path belongs to the set if and only if
the context is equal to a list of edges constructed from the path s.t. each edge
with a kind belonging to the filter is preserved and any other is removed.
A context coupled with a node represents the set of its paths restricted to
those terminating at the node.
We demonstrate of a meaning of a pair “node,context” on example canonical
program in Fig 2 (b) constructed for the C function in Fig 2 (a). We consider
several contexts coupled with the same node labeled by {13..15}. We list the
contexts in the following table together with their creation filters and with de-
scription of set of paths they represent:
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int1 btree contains2(3int4 key5,6btree node7*8 node9)10{11
int12 i13=14015;16
while17(18i19 <20 node21->22nkeys23 &&24 node25->26key27[28i29]30 <31key32)33
++34i35;36
if37(38i39 <40 node41->42nkeys43 &&44 node45->46key47[48i49]50 ==51key52)53
return54 155;56
if57(58 node59->60child61[62i63 +64165]66 ==67NULL68)69
return70 071;72
return73 btree contains74(75key76,77 node78->79child80[81i82 +83184]85)86;87
}88
(a)
13..15
19..23 25..32
34..35
39..43 45..52
59..68
74..86
71 55
C
B
B B
B
B
B
B B
B
B
1
5
10
7
6
8
2
9
3 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
i=014
i<node->nkeys
20
i>=node->nkeys20
node->key[i]<key31
++i
34
e
node->key[i]>=key
31
node->key[i]==key
51
@ret=1
55
tmp=node->child[i+1]
tmp==NULL
67
tmp!=NULL
x
@ret=0
7167
74 tmp1=contains(key,tmp)
67
@ret=tmp1
74
node->key[i]!=key
51
6
7
8
23
4
1
5
10
9
x
x
(b) (c)
Fig. 2. A mapping between a canonical program (b) and an internal program repre-
sentation (c) both constructed for a C function (a) with tokens indexed. In (b) ignore
numbers labeling edges and labels B and C stand for branching and call kinds re-
spectively. (c) references the source code (a) via indices of root tokens of program
expressions (see bolt numbers labeling edges). Links between nodes of (b) and (c) were
computed by the default recipe. Namely, the link ?1 was set according to the case 1,
links ?2, ?3, ?4, according to the case 2, and all others according to the case 3.
Context Filter Descritption
[] ∅ All paths reaching the node.
[6, 6, 6, 6] {call} All possible paths to the node performing 4
recursive calls btree contains74.
[1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] {call, branching} The path looping twice in the while17
loop, then taking false branches of both
if37 and if57 (without evaluation of
==51) and then applying the recusrice call
btree contains74.
Since client’s mapping between a canonical program and an internal program
representation may be only partial, it may be impossible for the client to create
some contexts. For example, if the tail node of some branching edge is not
mapped, then the client cannot create a context for a filter with branching edges
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kind representing program paths passing only through that edge. Therefore,
properties of client’s analysis (like call-sensitivity or path-sensitivity) may not
always be reflected in the communication through contexts due to incompleteness
of the mapping.
Let us return back to the example above. Now we try to translate the node
(labeled by {13..15}) and all three contexts in the table to the internal program
representation in Fig. 2 (c). The link ?1 allow as to move from the node of the
canonical program to the corresponding node in the internal program represen-
tation. In this case we move to the entry node. Note that in case there is no link
for the node then we could not continue with the example.
The first context [] can be translated without any loss of accuracy, i.e. the
set of path represented by the context does not have to be extended. The reason
is simple, the context represents all paths from the programs entry up to our
translated entry node (including any number of recursive calls, etc.).
The second context [6, 6, 6, 6] can also be translated without a loss of accu-
racy. That is because links ?10 and ?4 uniquely map the edge 6 to the path
consisting of two edges associated the line 74 and just one of then is the call
edge. The call site is thus uniquely identified.
The third context [1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] contains edges, namely 3, 4, and 5, which
cannot be translated to the internal program representation, since we do not have
links for tail nodes of the edges 3 and 4. So, we have to reduce the context into
[1, 2, 1, 2, 6]. Now we can translate all edges: Edges 1 and 2 of the loop translate
to edges with lines 20 and 31 in the corresponding loop (we used links ?5, ?6,
and ?7 for the translation), and the edge 6 is translated the same way as for
the second context. In terms of the canonical program (Fig. 2 (b)) the reduced
context [1, 2, 1, 2, 6] extend the set of paths over the original one (as described
in the table) by those paths which go through the node labeled by {45..52}.
Nevertheless, if we look into the internal program representation (Fig. 2 (c)),
then both the original and the reduced context represent the same set of paths,
because of the optimised shape of the program representation. Namely, there is
only one possible path from the loop (left along the edge with the line 20) to the
call site. Therefore, a reduction of a context does not necessary implied a loss of
precision.
Now we look at the opposite direction. We consider the following path in
the internal program representation expressed in term of lines labeling edges:
[14,20,31,34,20,31,34,20,67,67,74]. We now translate this path to the canonical
program in a form of a context constructed for a filter the filter {call, branching}.
The edge 14 can be translated to the canonical program, since we have links ?1
and ?5. Nevertheless, the corresponding edge is neither call nor branching edge
in the canonical program. So, we skip it. Edges 20 and 31 can be translated
to branching edges 1 and 2 respectively. We further skip both edges 34 for the
same reason as for the edge 14. Next, the edge 20 and both edges 67 cannot
be mapped because of lack of links between nodes. And the call edge 74 can be
mapped to the call edge 6. Therefore, we end up with the context [1, 2, 1, 2, 6].
This is the reduced context we discussed above. Observe that we were unable to
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reconstruct the more precise context [1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] due to lack of mapping
between nodes.
Finally, observe that the exit node of the canonical program is mapped to
three exit nodes of the internal program representation. So, if we want to trans-
late a pair “the exit node, context” to the internal program representation,
then we may get three translated pairs “node′?2,context
′”, “node′?3,context
′”,
and “node′?4,context
′”, which are supposed to be considered together (as union).
Now we define a special form of context reduction using a filter. Given a
context and a filter, a reduced context by the filter is constructed from the given
context s.t. each edge whose kind does not belong to the intersection of the filter
and the construction filter of the context is removed.
Multi-threading Different threads may be distinguished through a context: A
construct which causes a creation of a new thread can be modeled in a canonical
program by an artificially introduced branching (e.g. by two parallel edges).
Clients may decide to use special labels and filters for these edges. We do not
introduce them, because they are not necessary in further presentation.
2.2 Canonical memory
Given a program written in a certain programming language, a canonical mem-
ory is a model of program’s memory designed and used by clients for purposes of
their communication. Organisation of memory may differ significantly for differ-
ent languages, consider for example C and Prolog. Here we provide a “default”
canonical memory where we model only address space and dereferences of ad-
dresses (which is sufficient for purposes of communication). The model is thus
very low-level.
Addressing of program’s memory is based on the common segment-offset
style. Given a program and an ordered list of all its identifiers referencing mem-
ory1 a segment is any integer between 0 and the number of identifiers in the list.
The segment 0 is reserved for modeling of the standard invalid memory, repre-
sented by the NULL pointer in some languages. Other segments represent indices
of identifiers in the list. We recommend to order identifiers in the list according
to their token-indices (each identifier is also a lexical token), since there can be
several identifiers with the same name. An offset is any non-negative integer.
A sequence of bytes starting at a given segment and offset can have any of
the following type interpretations:
i8, i16, i32, i64 A signed 8,16,32,64-bit integer.
u8, u16, u32, u64 An unsigned 8,16,32,64-bit integer.
f32, f64 A 32,64-bit floating point number.
seg, off A representation of addresses (pointers).
A concrete encoding of these types is given either by the program’s deployment
machine, or on a mutual agreement of clients. seg and off should be encoded
1 Using the terminology of C language: All those which may be used as l-values.
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as unsigned integers big enough to capture available address space. Data of
composed types can be communicated with other clients only after their decom-
position to elements of basic types above.
A dereference is a triple consisting of a segment expression, an offset expres-
sion, and a type. A segment expression is either a segment, or a dereference of
the type seg. An offset expression is any integer expression over integer con-
stants, interpreted functions for addition, multiplication, etc., and over deref-
erences of either any integer type or the type off. A dereference represents a
type-interpreted values of bytes pointed to by its segment and offset expressions.
A dereference is called basic if neither segment nor offset expression contains any
dereference.
A value in the memory referenced by a program identifier is directly denoted
by a basic dereference. A value stored in a non-leaked memory in the program’s
heap can always be referenced by a finite sequence of dereferences starting with
a certain program identifier. The sequence can always be expressed by nesting
of dereferences inside segment and offset expressions of a non-basic dereference.
Memory of a record on the top of the program’s call stack is directly read by
basic dereferences. Memory of the records deeper in the stack is accessed via
non-basic dereferences exactly the same way as the memory in the program’s
heap.
void foo(int** p) {}
void main() {
int* p=(int*)malloc(100);
foo(&p);
free(p);
}
Identifier Segment
foo 1
foo::p 2
main 3
main::p 4
(a) (b)
Dereference Description
(2, 0, seg) Segment of an address stored in foo::p.
(2, 0, off) Offset of an address stored in foo::p.
((2, 0, seg), (2, 0, off), seg) Segment of an address stored in main::p.
((2, 0, seg), (2, 0, off), off) Offset of an address stored in main::p.
(((2, 0, seg), (2, 0, off), seg),
((2, 0, seg), (2, 0, off), off) + 12,
i32)
A value of the fourth element of the allo-
cated array (we assume sizeof(int)==4).
(c)
Fig. 3. Example for dereferences: (a) C program to be considered. (b) An ordered list
of program’s identifiers and a mapping to segments. (c) Five dereferences and their
descriptions. It is assumed the instruction counter is inside the function foo.
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Note that threads do not have to be considered here, since they may be
distinguished through a context (see page 9). In Fig. 3 there is an example how
a canonical memory is used.
2.3 Client’s side of the communication protocol
Client’s communication protocol is a specification of six functions. A client has
to implement each of them. The specifications are the following:
get values(node,context,dereferences,self call) -> formula
A client is queried for a superset of all concrete program states represented
by all his abstract states related to the node and the context. In other words,
the client is queries for an over-approximation of his current knowledge about
program’s behaviour regarding the node and the context.
The passed dereferences can be used to determine what superset will be
computed. Typically, knowledge in the abstract states about memory addressed
by no dereference in dereferences is ignored. For example, let us suppose that
program variables a and b are presented by basic dereferences (2, 0, i32) and
(3, 0, i32) respectively, and dereferences = {(2, 0, i32)}. Then the client may
ignore his knowledge about (3, 0, i32) when computing an answer to the query.
On the other hand, if client’s knowledge about a is expressed in a form of a
constraint over several variables, like a + 2(b − 3) < 0, then (3, 0, i32) can be
considered for the answer as well.
The superset is then encoded as a quantifier-free first order logic formula over
dereferences in a standard format all client agreed on, e.g. SMT-LIB2 [25]. Any
such formula may only contain interpreted symbols from theories of integers,
Peano’s arithmetic, and reals. The only uninterpreted symbols are related to
dereferences: A dereference with a segment expression s, an offset expression
o, and a type t is encoded as an application of a binary uninterpreted function
DEREF t to arguments s and o. It is not necessary to provide declarations of these
uninterpreted functions, since all clients know their exact meanings. Returning
back to the example above, client’s answer in SMT-LIB2 format may look like
this: (< (+ (+ (DEREF i32 2 0) (* 2 (DEREF i32 3 0))) (- 6)) 0).
It is further highly recommended for clients to agree on additional syntacti-
cal restrictions for formulae. They should not restrict expressivity, they should
ease decoding of answers. Clients may for example consider these: The formula
is in DNF, right hand side of any (in)equality is always a numeric constant,
distributive laws are applied where possible, constant expressions are simplified,
no use of binary subtractions, etc. The last tree restrictions were applied in the
example above.
If the client does not have established the mapping for the passed node, then
he returns a simple tautology, e.g. (= 1 1).
The argument self call is true if the client is the one who initiated the
query. Otherwise it is false.
get coverage(node,context) -> coverage
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A client is supposed to compute a real number between 0 and 1. This number
represents a measure, how much the current client’s abstract state space covers
the set of all concrete program states determined by the node and the context.
The value 0 means that the client covers no concrete state and the value 1 means
that all concrete states are covered. Values in-between 0 and 1 can be computed
from a progress observed in the abstract state space from the start of the analysis
up to the current time point. We provide more details in Sec. 2.7.
The client returns 0, if he does not have established the mapping for the
passed node.
is relevant coverage(node,context,coverage,self coverage) -> bool
A client is asked whether coverage computed by some other client is big
enough so that this client would accept result of a call to the function get values
of the other client. Clearly, the client returns false whenever coverage is 0.
The argument self coverage is the result of the function get coverage of this
client. This values may be useful for the client to make the decision. We provide
more details to the decision in Sec. 2.7.
The client returns false, if he does not have established the mapping for the
passed node.
is memory over approximated() -> bool
A client is supposed to return false if any of the following cases:
1. The client has updated an abstract state but he has not send a notification
on location outdated to the server about the update yet.
2. Client’s function can improve memory over approximation returns true.
Otherwise, the client returns true. Observe that the function may return true
even though client’s abstract state space currently does not expresses all possible
behaviour of the analysed program. This may happen when client’s computation
used values from other clients (via get values) for coverages less then 1.
can improve memory over approximation() -> bool
A client returns true if he sees a chance in making a progress towards ex-
pressing all possible behaviour of the analysed program. Otherwise, he returns
false. Note that the answer true does not imply the client will necessarily ever
do such a progress.
on location outdated(node,context,coverage,self call) -> none
A client is notified through this function that abstract state space of some
client has been updated. The node and the context provide a closer description
what set of concrete program states the update was relevant for.
The argument coverage is the result of the function get coverage of the
client who issued this notification on the updated version of his abstract state
space. The argument self call is true if the client is the one who issued the
query. Otherwise it is false.
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If the client does not have established the mapping for the passed node, he
should perform a graph search in the canonical program to find all nearest reach-
able nodes with mappings and apply the notification for each of them. Note that
the context has to be extended/reduced for each node separately using client
filter by considering all paths between the passed and the searched node.
A passed context to some of the protocol functions may contain edges whose
nodes do not appear in the mapping between the canonical program and client’s
internal program representation. Such edges has to be removed. This removal
may produce a context representing a larger set of program paths. Nevertheless,
clients computation in protocol functions must be based on such larger contexts.
All protocol functions above are supposed to terminate quickly. We cannot
give exact complexities, but each of them should terminate (much) sooner than
client’s algorithm which transforms an abstract state along a program’s edge.
If an evaluation of any function above does not finish before the time-out,
then the client may cancel its evaluation without sending any response to the
server. Also, any queries from the server issued after the time-out may be ignored.
A client may assume correctness of data received from other clients in in-
dividual queries. He may also assume other clients meet all requirements given
in this section. And he may further assume the server meets all requirements
given in the section below. But he cannot make any other assumptions about
the communication. It means that based on the mentioned assumptions he has
to check by himself for the correctness of implementations of his communication
related code in isolation from others by considering all possible scenarios how
the communication may affects his results and performance.
2.4 Server’s side of the communication protocol
Server’s communication protocol is a specification of four functions. A server has
to implement each of them. The specifications are the following:
get values(node,context,trace,dereferences,client) -> formula
A client client calls this function in order to receive a knowledge about
memory content from all clients. The server handles the query as follows:
1 formula := client.get_values(node,context,dereferences,true)
2 cov0 := client.get_coverage(node,context)
3 for every other client C do
4 cov := C.get_coverage(node,context)
5 if client.is_relevant_coverage(node,context,cov,cov0)) then
6 F := C.get_values(node,context,dereferences,false)
8 formula := make_conjunction(formula,F)
9 return formula
The use of conjunction as the connective between formulae has the meaning of
intersection of sets of concrete program states represented by the formulae.
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is memory over approximated() -> bool
A client calls this function in order to check whether abstract state spaces of
all clients caver all possible behaviour of the analysed program. The server han-
dles the query by invoking functions is memory over approximated of all clients
and returns true if all the clients respond by true and no on location outdated
query is being evaluated during evaluation of this query. Otherwise, false is re-
turned.
can improve memory over approximation() -> bool
A client calls this function in order to check whether at least one client can
hopefully get his abstract state spaces closer to complete coverage of all possible
behaviour of the analysed program. The server handles the query by invoking
functions can improve memory over approximation of all clients and returns
true if at least one client respond by true. Otherwise, false is returned.
on location outdated(node,context,coverage,client) -> none
A client has to calls this function in order to notify others about the fact that
his abstract state space has been updated. The passed client is the one who
issues the notification. The node and the context provide a closer description
what set of concrete program states the update is relevant for. The server is
responsible for delivering the notification to all clients. So, the server invokes
functions on location outdated of all clients with the last argument true in
case of the client and with false for all other clients.
A client may call any of these function any time before the time-out. If an
evaluation of a query does not finish before the time-out the server may cancel
the evaluation without any response to any client. Also, queries issued after the
time-out may be ignored by the server.
2.5 Issuing get values for highly over-approximated operators
Although it is completely up to a client to decide where and when to issue
get values queries, there is rather general scenario for recommended application
of such queries: It is quite common that a client highly over-approximates effects
of some language operators. Consider for example C language and bit-operators
(like conjunction, negation, etc.), pointer arithmetic, or some math functions
(like sqrt, pow, sin, etc.). The client may take advantage of the communication
to improve the precision. We demonstrate this on a the following simple example.
Let us consider a client who does not support pointers and who is about
to execute a C assignment i=*p, where i and p have types int and int*
respectively. Although the client cannot evaluate the sub-expression p (since
it is a pointer), he can issue a query to other clients. Let us say the answer
is (and (= (DEREF seg 2 0) 3) (= (DEREF off 2 0) 4)), where we assume
that p is mapped to the segment 2. If the basic dereference (3, 4, i32) corre-
sponds to a program variable, j say, than the client may evaluate the assignment
as it was i=j. Otherwise, the client may issue another query for the dereference
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(3, 4, i32). A received answer represents (an over-approximation of) an i32
value to be assigned to i.
2.6 Decoding answers from get values can loose precision
A formula returned from a get values query may encode an information whose
precision is beyond expressivity of client’s abstract state space. In any such case a
lose of precision is inevitable. Another source of the lose can lie in an incomplete
implementation of client’s decoding procedure. Indeed, a returned formula can be
arbitrarily complex. A useful information may be encoded in several transitively
dependent constraints. Client’s decoding procedure may simply ignore them. It
is worth noting that a complete implementation of the decoding may lead to a
non-trivial programming effort.
We show this on the example from the previous sub-section, where we suppose
the client performs the classic interval analysis and we consider the situation
when the client receives an answer for the second query, i.e. for the dereference
(3, 4, i32). Possible answers for the query may look like these:
– (= (DEREF i32 3 4) 3)
– (and (< (- (DEREF i32 3 4)) (- 3)) (< (DEREF i32 3 4) 10))
– (or (< (DEREF i32 3 4) 3) (= (DEREF i32 3 4) 10))
– (= (+ (* 2 (DEREF i32 3 4)) (DEREF i32 4 0)) 10)
Although all of these formulae can be converted to intervals, the client may
decide to restrict implementation of his decoding procedure to first two formulae,
since decoding of others would lead to a loss of precision anyway. Therefore, the
last two formulae are decoded as they are tautologies (i.e. any possible value).
2.7 Coverage oracle
Client’s protocol functions get coverage and is relevant coverage require
an estimation of how many concrete program states are represented by client’s
current abstract state space.
The estimation can be based on observation of progress of client’s abstract
state space from the beginning of the analysis up to the current time. For a
given node and context the client may for example observe changes in counts of
abstract states, sizes of abstract states, or counts of updates of abstract states
in time. In order to compute an estimate, the client needs to compare these
“progress properties” with similar ones in client’s knowledge base. We can build
a knowledge base for a client s.t. we run the client in isolation (i.e. without
any communication) on a sufficiently large training set of benchmarks. For each
benchmark the client observes a progress of his progress properties. Then we
relate properties of analysed benchmarks (like number of tokens, number of
loops, recursive functions, pointer dereferences, etc.) with functions from analy-
sis time (scaled into the interval [0, 1)) to the corresponding values of progress
properties. In order to use the knowledge base the client need three functions.
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A distance function between program properties, a distance function between
progress properties, and a “progress” function which for a given program prop-
erties and a passed (and scaled) analysis time finds a closed progress properties
in the knowledge base.
For get coverage the client should extend the knowledge base s.t. progress
properties are annotated by numbers between 0 and 1 representing coverages.
This is possible, since the client has a complete information for each benchmark.
The estimate (i.e. the resulting coverage) then corresponds to annotation of the
closest progress properties in the knowledge base to the current ones.
In case of is relevant coverage the client uses his progress function to find
a time for which the function returns closest properties to the current ones. The
client tweaks the protocol function according to the time he found subtracted by
the current time (scaled to [0, 1)) in a way: bigger the result, higher coverages are
accepted. The tweaking can ideally be sensitive to a passed node and context.
2.8 Safety outdate
There are situations which cannot be resolved only by functions get coverage
and is relevant coverage. Let us consider a client whose goal is to compute
an over-approximation of program’s behaviour and there is a part of his abstract
state space (for some node and context) whose abstract states were computed
from an information of other clients with coverages less than 1. The client cannot
be satisfied with these states, if server’s query is memory over approximated
returns false. It may happen the query remain false till the time-out. It may
also happen that the client does not receive notifications on location outdated
for that part of his abstract state space.
In order to succeed in the computation of an over-approximation the client
may force a re-computation of that part of the state space in sufficiently long
time before the time-out. To prevent repetition of this situation in the subsequent
computation the client may tweak his is relevant coverage function s.t. for
the node and context of the problematic part of the state space only coverages
1 are accepted.
3 Case Study: Box, Polka, Symbolic execution
In this case study we attempt to experimentally evaluate how much clients may
ideally improve their results due to the communication. We thus investigate the
limit case, where client are offered a maximal opportunities for the communica-
tion: communication at each node, no overhead of message delivery, etc.
We embedded three clients called Box, Polka, and Symbolic execution into
a single tool [24]. The tool itself stands for the server. Clients are separate and
completely independent modules in the tool, they can communicate only with
the server through his protocol functions. The tool builds a single read-only
internal program representation, which is referenced by all clients. The internal
program representation simultaneously serves as a canonical program. Clients
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may thus communicate at each node. Since all clients run on a single main
thread, they perform their computations in small regularly interleaved steps. A
step corresponds to an update of an abstract state space by taking one or more
edges which all always share either head or tail node. A client determines by
himself, i.e. independently to other clients, which edges he will take in what
computation step. A client may issue communication queries to the server only
during his step. Responses from other clients are also computed and returned in
that step. This process is purely sequential.
3.1 Clients: Box and Polka
These two clients have many things in common. First of all, implementations
of their communication-related code is very similar. Also, they represent two
instances of the abstract interpretation framework [7]. While Box uses intervals
to represent a memory content, Polka uses polyhedrons. Moreover, both are
implemented in the same library called Apron [21]. Therefore, we join their
description here, but all differences are explicitly stated.
Both clients are integrated into the tool in the default setting: Join operators
are applied at each node with an in-degree greater then 1, widening operators
are applied at each loop head and function entry node (because of recursion),
and all heap allocations performed along the same edge are indistinguishable for
the same context. Both clients perform call-sensitive analysis, and they construct
contexts for filters consisting of call edges kind.
Both clients issue queries to the server in same situations. Whenever a part
of an abstract state space is updated the query on location outdated is issued.
The query get values is issued in two situations during a computational step
of a client, when a source abstract state is supposed to be transformed along
a program edge. First, instead of taking the source abstract state directly from
the abstract state space there is used a result of get values (after its transla-
tion to an abstract state). Second, during evaluation of a program expression
associated with the edge: When the client does not have enough information for
an evaluation of some sub-expression (e.g. a pointer dereference), then the client
asks other (e.g. for possible values of the pointer) and continues the evaluation
with that information.
In the following subsections we discuss those modules of these clients, which
are related to the communication.
Coverage oracle
This module records statistical data about a progress of client’s abstract
state space and it plays an important role in the implementation of the protocol
function get coverage.
The oracle maintains a map from nodes and contexts to ordinal numbers of
client’s computational steps in which the corresponding parts of the abstract
state space were updated for the last.
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Given a node, a context, and a count n of all passed computation steps
(including the current one) the oracle computes the corresponding coverage as
a number 1 − (0.25 ∗ u + 0.75 ∗ v)/n, where u is an average of all values in the
map mapped to by the context (and any node), and v is the value in the map
for the node and the context. The term was inferred experimentally.
Safety outdate
There are three actions which may be applied during the safety outdate:
1. Tweaking of client’s function is relevant coverage s.t. it returns false
for any coverage less then 1.
2. Marking of all abstract states appearing in a list extended by the function
on location outdated (see the description of the protocol function below)
as to be recomputed.
3. Marking of all abstract states in the current abstract state space to be re-
computed.
Until the safety outdate is applied, it can be triggered in the following cases:
(a) If server’s function is memory over approximated returns true, then ac-
tions 1. and 2. are applied.
(b) If server’s function can improve memory over approximation returns false,
then actions 1. and 3. are applied.
(c) Let m be a number of communicating clients, n be a number of nodes in the
program, t be the time point of the time-out in milliseconds, and c be 250
for Box and 500 for Polka. If the current time point is greater or equal to
max{0, t− c ·m · n}, then actions 1. and 3. are applied. Both “max” terms
were adjusted experimentally.
Communication protocol
Box and Polka implement the mandatory functions of the protocol as follows:
get values: The function first collects all abstract states relevant to the passed
node and a reduced context computed from the passed context and the client’s
filter. An abstract state is a list of Apron’s linear constraints over dereferences
(represented via strings in Apron). Each state is converted into a conjunction
of predicates, where each predicate is a direct conversion of a constraint from
Apron’s internal data structures. Subsequently, from each conjunction there are
removed all predicates which are irrelevant to the passed set of dereferences. The
function then returns a disjunction of the resulting conjunctions.
get coverage: For each abstract states relevant to the passed node and a
reduced context computed from the passed context and the client’s filter it calls
the coverage oracle with the node and the reduced context. When n is a number
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of such states and ci is a value returned by the oracle for the i-th state, then
the function returns the value (
∑n
i=1 ci)/max{1, n}. The term was adjusted
experimentally.
is relevant coverage: If the safety outdate was already applied, then it re-
turns true only if the passed coverage is equal to 1. Otherwise, there is computed
a scale for the passed self-coverage. The scale is initialised to 1 and according to
each property the of the passed node it is multiplied by coefficients in this table:
Client Loop head Function entry Return node Join node
Box 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25
Polka 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.9
The values were adjusted experimentally. The function returns true only if the
passed coverage is greater or equal to the self-coverage multiplied by the scale.
is memory over approximated: Returns true when a fixed-point is reached,
i.e. when there is no abstract state (identified by a node and context) to be
updated. Otherwise, it returns false.
can improve memory over approximation: Returns a negated value from the
function is memory over approximated.
on location outdated: If this is not the self-call and a call to the function
is relevant coverage for the passed coverage returns false, then the function
adds all abstract states corresponding to the passed node and context to a list
of “states for safety outdate” and then terminates. Otherwise, it marking all
abstract states corresponding the passed node and context for a re-computation.
Correctness
The client (Box or Polka) claims that program’s behaviour was successfully
over-approximated only if his function is memory over approximated return
true and the safety outdate was applied.
After application of the safety outdate only values with coverage equal to
1 are accepted. If the safety outdate was triggered by the case (b) or (c), each
abstract state was recomputed. Otherwise, the case (a) was triggered and so
the server returned true from his function is memory over approximated. The
computation performed so far was thus based either on final memory over-
approximations from other clients or on re-computed abstract states where the
client rejected final values of others due to low coverages.
3.2 Client: Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [16] is similar to standard program execution. The key differ-
ence is that while the standard program execution runs the program on concrete
input data (numbers), the symbolic execution runs the program on symbols.
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Each symbol represents a concrete, but yet unknown, input value. Executed
program paths are recorded in a tree, where the root corresponds to the en-
try node and a leaf node either represents a termination of the execution or it
belongs into the exploration frontier, i.e. it remains to compute its successors.
From the communication point of view it is important to mention that this
technique attempts to explore all feasible program paths. This goal is achieved
very rarely in practice, only for programs with finite and quite low number of
such paths. Therefore, the technique primarily focuses on searching for defects
and typically end up with an under-approximation of program’s behaviour.
The client is integrated into the tool in the default setting: There is fixed the
breadth-first exploration strategy of feasible program paths, the variable storage-
referencing problem is resolved by branching, there is only one SMT solver used
for SAT queries, and there is no cache in front of the solver. The filter of the
client consist of both call and branching kinds of edges.
In the following subsections we discuss only those modules of the client, which
are related to the communication with others.
Coverage oracle
This module records statistical data about both a progress of client’s ab-
stract state space and queries issued to the client. It serves as the key part in
implementations of protocol functions get values and get coverage.
The main part of the oracle is a map from node and context to triples
(formula, num state updates, num formula updates). The component formula
is a formula over dereferences, num state updates is a counter of updates of the
triple, and num formula updates counts number of updates of the formula.
Each triple is initialised as (true,0,0).
The oracle is called at the end of each client’s step in order to reflect updates
he made. Given a node and context related to some of client’s updates, the oracle
performs the following three steps: First, he expresses all abstract states corre-
sponding to the node and the context in a form of a formula over dereferences
according to a process described in the next sub-section. Then, he searches in
the map for a triple using the node and the context. Lastly, the triple is updated
s.t. num state updates is incremented, and if the newly computed formula is
not logically equal to formula in the triple, then formula is overwritten by the
new one and the counter num formula updates is incremented. In the case the
formula was updated in the triple whole the record is registered into a special
queue, if it is not already there. The client extracts records of the queue regularly
in each step with a delay 10s and issues the query on location outdated to the
server. The delay prevents frequent notifications for nodes inside loops, where
symbolic execution tends to cycle very quickly for long time.
The oracle is called from function of client’s communication protocol. These
functions query the oracle fro triples stored in the map. For each such query, if
the searched triple has num state updates equal to 0, then the oracle automat-
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ically performs its update according to the procedure above, before the triple is
returned.
Building of response formula
Given a node, a context, and the filter of the client, the procedure first collects
all abstract states attached to nodes of the client’s symbolic execution tree which
are relevant to the given program node and a reduced context computed from
the given context and the filter. Note that the client’s filter consists of both
branching and call edge kinds, since symbolic execution is fully path and context
sensitive. Also note that each collected abstract state consists of a mapping from
dereferences to expressions over input symbols and a quantifier-free conjunction
of predicates over input symbols.
For each abstract state there is constructed a formula, which is initialised
as the conjunction of predicates of the state. Next, for each pair in the map of
the state a new conjunct is added into the formula. This conjunct is an equality
between the dereference and the expression of the pair. Then, each equality in the
formula, which consists of a dereference and an input symbols, all occurrences of
the symbol in the formula is replaced by the dereferences. Finally, each predicate
in the formula which still contains any input symbol is removed from the formula.
From formulae we computed for each collected abstract state we now build a
resulting formula. The formula is a conjunction of predicates which are common
to all computed formulae (according to logical equality) and the strongest in-
equalities between dereferences and numerical constants deducible from all com-
puted formulae. Although we attempt to find as many common predicates and
inequalities as possible, we may early terminate the search in order to preserve
performance of the whole query.
Communication protocol
The client implements the mandatory functions of the protocol as follows:
get values: The function queries the coverage oracle for a triple for the passed
node and context and returns the component formula of the triple.
get coverage: If is memory over approximated returns 1, the also this func-
tion returns 1. Otherwise, it queries the coverage oracle for a triple for the passed
node and context. The function then returns a coverage value computed accord-
ing to the following experimentally established term 1 − 1(s−f+1)·s+1 , where s
and f stands for num state updates and num formula updates respectively.
is relevant coverage: This function always returns false, since no informa-
tion is taken from other clients. This client only provides information to others.
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is memory over approximated: Returns true when the exploration frontier is
empty and no state was force-terminated due to a failure. A majority of failures
come from an SMT solver, which fails to decide satisfiability of a path condition
of a program state. Another important sources are unsupported bit operators
and presence of inline assembly.
can improve memory over approximation: Returns true if the exploration
frontier is not empty. Otherwise, returns false.
on location outdated: This function does nothing, since this client does not
take any information from others. The client only provides information.
Correctness
The client does not accept values from others.
3.3 Server: The tool
The server implements all his protocol functions (see section 2.4) in purely se-
quential manner. It means that clients are queried for responses one by one
and when all responses are collected the result is returned back the the client
initiating the query.
The server and all clients run of the same main thread and all queries from
clients are issued also from that thread. It means that all queries are issued
sequentially: A next query may be issues only after the previous one is completed.
3.4 Evaluation
We evaluated clients of the case study in five different configurations. Each con-
figuration specifies what clients are used and whether they can communicate or
not. We denote configurations using the following abbreviations: b*p*s, b+p+s,
b+p, b+s, p+s. Symbols ‘b’, ‘p’, and ‘s’ stand for Box, Polka, and Symbolic
execution respectively, and ‘+’ and ‘*’ stand for communication enabled and
disabled respectively. For each configuration we assume that either all clients
communicate with each other (the use of ‘+’) or none of them (the use of ‘*’).
We performed the evaluation on SV-COMP 2015 [26] benchmark suite, re-
vision 571. The revision consists of 5861 benchmarks in 48 directories. In order
to make the evaluation manageable for us, we put a requirement that whole the
evaluation should finish within one week of continuous computation2. Therefore,
we picked 10 randomly chosen benchmarks from each directory (or less if there
was not enough) and so we got 473 benchmarks in 48 directories, see Appendix C.
Since this was still not enough we set a time-out 2.5 minutes and a memory-out
512MB for each client in each configuration. It means, for example, that b+p
2 The used a server: 32xIntel Xenon E5-2650 @ 2GHz, 64GB RAM, Debian 4.6.3.
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had the time-out 5 minutes and the memory-out 1024MB, b*p*s had the time-
out 7.5 minutes and the memory-out 1536MB, etc. Remember that clients share
time (steps are interleaved) and memory (all run on a single thread) within a
configuration, see page 16.
We compared results of each combination of configurations. The compari-
son was always done separately per client: given two configurations and a client
appearing in both of them we only consider results of that client in both config-
urations for the comparison.
Configuration Comparison per node Comparison per benchmark
1st 2nd fail neq eq 1st 2nd fail neq 1st 2nd 1st! 2nd! eq!
b*p*s b+p+s 13 246 13021 627 9563 1 20 56 191 23 148 35
b*p*s b+p 13 342 15042 613 10043 1 37 46 243 7 186 34
b*p*s b+s 13 309 12444 450 8202 1 10 36 128 28 115 71
b+p+s b+p 13 1167 25025 3707 1851 1 42 120 123 43 48 97
b+p+s b+s 13 142 24753 1170 708 1 14 66 34 43 17 155
b+p b+s 13 889 21311 1798 2899 1 41 106 76 56 28 99
Configuration Comparison per node Comparison per benchmark
1st 2nd fail neq eq 1st 2nd fail neq 1st 2nd 1st! 2nd! eq!
b*p*s b+p+s 20 487 10616 401 12672 1 42 38 199 16 157 43
b*p*s b+p 26 319 11691 168 12923 1 39 23 224 5 183 51
b*p*s p+s 20 609 10689 455 12119 1 57 44 196 12 136 50
b+p+s b+p 14 663 30462 2217 1489 1 29 93 87 50 53 137
b+p+s p+s 0 253 32268 1307 446 0 19 74 40 53 24 182
b+p p+s 14 691 30187 1960 1903 1 46 115 88 58 33 129
Fig. 4. Comparison of invariants for clients Box (top) and Polka (bottom). Meaning of
columns from left: “1st”,“2nd” - 1st and 2nd compared configuration, “fail” - failures
of Z3, “neq” - incomparable (neither is stronger), “eq” - logically equal, “1st”,“2nd” -
1st,2nd configuration has stronger invariant ; “fail” - at least one Z3 failure, “neq” -
contains incomparable invariants, “1st”,“2nd” - has at least one stronger invariant than
in 2nd,1st configuration, “1st!”,“2nd!” - at least one stronger but no weaker invariant
than in 2st,1nd configuration, “eq!” - all invariant are logically equal.
We focused on two kinds of measurements. First, we compared a precision
of invariants computed by clients Box and Polka. Symbolic execution does not
provide this kind of information. The clients attempt to compute for each node
a strongest invariant over-approximating all concrete states which can be seen
at the node. We used Z3 [27] SMT solver to compare invariants. Results are pre-
sented in Fig. 4. The numbers for “Comparison per node” are summary counts
of nodes of all considered benchmarks together. And the numbers for “Compar-
ison per benchmark” are simply counts of considered benchmarks. Note that for
each client there were only considered those benchmarks for which the client
terminated with the state “Success” in both compared configurations.
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We can observe the following facts in data in Fig. 4:
– Each configuration may bring us improvements over others: We can clearly
see this phenomena for all pairs of configurations in both kinds of com-
parisons in tables of both clients. We can thus expect that for any chosen
combination of clients we get some new results in terms of strengthened
invariants.
– There is no configuration strictly dominating all others: We can only read
patterns in the data, like:
• A configurations with communicating clients gives us at least one order
of magnitude more precise invariants than isolated clients.
• More communicating clients, more strengthened invariants.
• Count of incomparable invariants and lower count of strengthened in-
variants can be expected in the same order of magnitude.
• More improved invariants typically yields more improved benchmarks,
i.e. improvements are rather regularly distributed than highly concen-
trated in few benchmarks. Nevertheless, a degree of correlation is sensi-
tive to kinds of clients appearing in configurations, cf. fourth and sixth
rows for both Box and Polka.
Observations made for invariants can easily be adopted to very similar ob-
servations for benchmarks.
In the second measurement we focused on comparison of termination states
of individual clients as they are used in different configurations. We distinguish
termination states “Success”, “Time-out”, “Memory-out”, and “Crash”, all with
obvious meanings. Results are presented in Fig. 5. Numbers in each table repre-
sent counts of benchmarks.
We can observe the following facts in data in Fig. 5:
– Consumption of resources via communication does not imply a decrease of
successful termination: Considering “Success” data for all configurations
comparing with b*p*s for all clients, the communication caused a lose of
success termination states in the following percentages:
1st 2nd Box Polka Sym.exec.
b*p*s b+p+s 3.8 -3.2 1.9
b*p*s b+p -8.4 -9.5 -
b*p*s b+s 11.5 - -0.6
b*p*s p+s - -3.5 3.2
In 5 of 9 cases we see an increase of “Success” termination states. The average
of these numbers is -0.53%. We may thus expect about 0.5% increase of
“Success” termination states on average per client due to reduced overall
time and memory consumption (the influence of crashes is less than 6%).
– Resources consumption via communication heavily depends on kinds of clients:
This statement is based on the following patterns which dominate data:
• Symbolic execution is a major source of “Time-out” termination states.
We can see this is tables of all clients: Whenever the client is present,
there is a high count of time-outs.
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Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 251 35 24 10 0 38 137 19 0 7 14 6
b*p*s b+p 285 1 25 10 0 3 143 13 0 7 14 0
b*p*s b+s 230 56 23 10 0 200 0 156 0 7 14 3
b+p+s b+p 275 0 35 13 35 0 137 0 6 7 6 0
b+p+s b+s 241 34 12 45 3 165 0 137 0 10 3 0
b+p b+s 245 65 8 12 1 198 0 143 0 7 0 3
Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 263 21 30 10 0 20 137 21 0 7 14 6
b*p*s b+p 283 1 28 10 0 2 143 15 0 7 14 0
b*p*s p+s 267 17 27 10 0 15 143 15 0 7 14 4
b+p+s b+p 289 4 22 10 20 2 137 0 6 7 6 0
b+p+s p+s 287 6 7 21 9 4 137 0 6 11 2 0
b+p p+s 294 17 0 12 0 13 143 0 0 7 0 4
Configuration Success Time-out Memory-out Crash
1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd eq 1st 2nd
b*p*s b+p+s 151 3 0 155 0 35 119 16 0 12 17 1
b*p*s b+s 148 6 7 155 0 153 0 136 0 10 19 0
b*p*s p+s 149 5 0 155 0 34 124 11 0 11 18 0
b+p+s b+s 147 4 8 190 0 118 0 119 0 10 3 0
b+p+s p+s 148 3 1 185 5 4 119 0 5 11 2 0
b+s p+s 148 7 1 189 119 0 0 0 124 10 0 1
Fig. 5. Comparison of termination states for clients Box (top), Polka (middle), and
Symbolic execution (bottom). Columns of “Configuration”: “1st”,“2nd” - 1st and 2nd
compared configuration ; All other columns: “eq” - equal state, “1st”,“2nd” - 1st,2nd
configuration has the state while 2nd,1st has some other.
• Polka is a major source of “Memory-out” termination states. We can see
this is tables of all clients: Whenever the client is present, there is a high
count of memory-outs.
The facts we observed in data of both figures lead as to a conclusion:
In order to get the best result we should run as many configurations as possible
and then merge their results. Since resources are always limited (like a number
of available computers or threads), we should use patterns (similar to those we
observed) in order to express preferences for certain configurations.
It is important to add that the presented anonymous communication ap-
proach provides a cheap way for building combinations of clients. Indeed, a
construction of a new client mostly involves an implementation of the commu-
nication interface and choosing right locations in client’s code, where to issue
communication queries. Now, having the best result for a certain benchmark for
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a group of n clients, an addition of a single new one will automatically gives as
1 + 1n+1
∑n
k=1 k
(
n+1
k
)
new configurations each with a potential to improve the
old result. In the case of our evaluation we would immediately get eight new
such configurations ready for execution.
An interested reader may have a look to Appendix A, where we put the
presented data in a form of histograms. A package with sources and binaries
of the tool used in the evaluation together with the computed results is freely
available here [24]. Details about the download, installation, and the use can be
found in Appendix B.
4 Related Work
There is a broad class of approaches dedicated to combining of lattice-based
analyses. They all are based either on a direct or a reduced product [8].
A direct product is fully automatic, it requires neither writing of resulting
operations nor modifications of the input ones. Nevertheless, composed analyses
do not interact and the product represents the least precise Cartesian product
of the analyses. No check for correctness is required.
A reduced product is in contrary the most precise Cartesian product, but it
is based on (non-computable) concretisation functions used in so called “reduce”
function. In practice, the issue is typically resolved by providing an approxima-
tion of the reduce function. But this implies a dedicated implementation for each
given combination of analyses. It is also necessary to check for correctness of the
approximation.
A logical product [14] automatically construct the most precise reduced prod-
uct of analyses whose elements are conjunctions of atomic facts over theories that
are convex, stably infinite, and disjoint. No check for correctness is required.
In [20] authors combine abstract domains for shape analyses using reduced
product. Each component reasons independently about different aspects of the
data structure invariant and then separately exchange information via a reduc-
tion operator.
Granger’s product [13] provides an elegant approximation of the reduce func-
tion of a reduced product. Each input analysis is extended by its own reduce
function from domains of all analyses to domain of the analysis owning the
function. Each analysis must only check whether its reduce function satisfies
necessary requirements. Note that each combination of analysis requires new
dedicated implementations of reduce functions.
An open product [5] substantially improves the Granger’s product, since it
removes the dependence between analyses. The only common property is an a
priory given set of queries (e.g. in the logic paradigm: “is a variable x surely
bound to a ground term?”). Each operation of each analysis is extended s.t. it
is parametrised by all possible valuations of the queries. Analyses are thus also
extended by boolean functions capable to compute individual parametrisations.
Each analysis has to check for itself for correctness of its extension.
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The requirement of a set of predefined queries in an open product was later
relaxed in [3] by replacing them by a language of the first order logic. Operations
of all analyses can then be parametrised by any formula of the language.
Composition of configurable program analyses [1] is based on a direct prod-
uct, whose precision can be improved via relations “transfer”, “merge”, “stop”,
“compare”, and “strengthen”. Each of these relations is defined over domains of
all composed analyses. Implementations of relations transfer, merge, and stop
cannot access abstract states of individual analyses, they can only apply their
operators and relations. There is no such restriction for implementations of com-
pare and strengthen. These two relations can be used in implementations of the
previous three. The composition requires neither modification nor extension of
implementations of input analyses. Nevertheless, the five relations mentioned
above require dedicated implementations for each combination of analyses. An
improved concept by a dynamic precision adjustment [2] introduced a relation
“prec”. This relation is also defined over domains of all composed analyses, so
its implementations also has to be provided for each combination of analyses.
In both the original and the improved concept one needs to check whether his
implementations of all the relations satisfy necessary requirements. It is further
important to mention that in [1] there was introduced a “location analysis”
modeling instruction counter. It can be composed with other analyses.
An advanced combination of lattice-based analyses can be found in Astre´e [9].
It is based on the idea of an open product with several extensions. The set of fixed
queries was replaced by an extensible set of kinds of constraints. An extension of
the set be a new kind implies extensions and checks for correctness of only those
analyses which want to use constraints of that kind. A constraint represents an
information of its kind about an analysed program. Analyses may exchange infor-
mation through input and output channels. Input channels provide information
on both the postcondition being computed and the precondition computed in
the last computation step. Output channels are used when an analysis wants to
send a message to others. Messages are elements of a separate abstract domain.
Messages are not always exchanged freely between analyses. An order of analyses
in a computational step matters. Typically, an analysis may freely communicate
with any predecessor.
An obvious difference between our approach and approaches above is that our
approach is not restricted to lattice-based analyses. Further important differences
can be expressed in terms of three features we mentioned in the introduction:
– Independence of clients: This feature provide only approaches based on the
open product, i.e. [5,3,9].
– Asynchronous execution of clients: Approaches above do not natively provide
this feature. Computational steps of all analyses are synchronised, i.e. they all
run in the same speed. An asynchronous execution can be emulated in some
extent in [1] through the use of several location analyses in one combination:
some location analysis stays on a certain location in several subsequents
steps in order to simulate slow-down of dependent analyses. Nevertheless,
27
by a use of more than one location analysis in a combination we may expect
enormous increase of complexity in designing relations transfer, merge, etc.
– Reuse of current implementations: Approaches based on the open product
are suited for the reuse. Nevertheless, approaches [5,3,9] require that all
composed analyses (synchronously) run on the same internal program rep-
resentation. And in [1] the reuse requires to look inside implementation of
each analysis and discover how the program is internally represented. Then
corresponding location analyses can be designed and implemented together
with all relations transfer, merge, etc. Nevertheless, this may imply enor-
mous amount of programing effort (which has to be repeated for different
combinations of analyses).
There is another broad class of approaches devoted to combining of program
analyses. They are focused on combining specific kinds of analyses. Typically,
two or more particular analyses are considered, e.g. predicate abstraction with
dynamic test generation [12], static checking and testing [10,19], different testing
techniques [6], symbolic and concrete execution [18], static and dynamic analy-
ses via program partitioning [15], data-flow with predicate lattices [11], data-flow
analyses in a compiler [4,17], etc., and a result is a new program analysis pos-
sessing advantages of individual analyses. Although these approaches give us
interesting new algorithms and ideas, they are orthogonal to our approach: Our
approach does not build “a new analysis”, we proposed an analysis-independent
communication model. In other words, we took an alternative path.
5 Conclusion
We presented an approach for a light-weight anonymous online communication
of existing implementations of program analyses (i.e. clients). In order to com-
municate with others a client has to implements the proposed client’s commu-
nication protocol and to identify places in his implementation where to issue
queries s.t. the received information may subsequently help to improve client’s
results. These steps are completely independent on other clients. The client also
has to check by himself for correctness of his analysis for all possible communica-
tion scenarios which may occur during analysis of a given program. Each client
performs his work on a private data and an internal program representation.
Nevertheless, the communication is performed in terms of common model of in-
struction counter (canonical program) and common memory addressing (canon-
ical memory). Therefore, communication queries are are typically coupled with
conversions from client’s internal data to common terms and back.
We also presented a case study with three communicating clients: two ab-
stract interpreters (intervals, polyhedrons) and one classic symbolic execution.
We evaluated five their configurations (how many and what client will communi-
cate) and we pairwise compared their results per client. We measured strength-
ening of invariant (for abstract interpreters) and termination states (for all).
The data shows that each combination may bring us new improvements in both
strengthened invariants and increased count of “success” termination states.
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Therefore, since there are 2n − 1 configurations for n clients, we can achieve
substantial gain compared to results of n isolated clients.
References
1. D. Beyer, T. A. Henzinger, and G. The´oduloz. Configurable software verifica-
tion: Concretizing the convergence of model checking and program analysis. In
Proceedings of CAV, pages 504–518. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
2. D. Beyer, T. A. Henzinger, and G. Theoduloz. Program analysis with dynamic
precision adjustment. In Proceedings of ASE, pages 29–38. IEEE, 2008.
3. N. Charlton. Verification of java programs with interacting analysis plugins. Elec-
tron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 145:131–150, 2006.
4. C. Click and K. D. Cooper. Combining analyses, combining optimizations. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 17(2):181–196, 1995.
5. A. Cortesi, B. Le Charlier, and P. Van Hentenryck. Combinations of abstract
domains for logic programming: Open product and generic pattern construction.
Sci. Comput. Program., 38(1-3):27–71, 2000.
6. D. Cotroneo, R. Pietrantuono, and S. Russo. A learning-based method for com-
bining testing techniques. In Proceedings of ICSE, pages 142–151. IEEE, 2013.
7. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: A unified lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In Proceedings
of the POPL, pages 238–252. ACM, 1977.
8. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In
Proceedings of POPL, pages 269–282. ACM, 1979.
9. P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret, L. Mauborgne, A. Mine´, D. Monniaux, and X. Rival.
Combination of abstractions in the ASTRE´E static analyzer. In Proceedings of
ASIAN, pages 272–300. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
10. Ch. Csallner and Y. Smaragdakis. Check ’n’ crash: Combining static checking and
testing. In Proceedings of ICSE, pages 422–431. ACM, 2005.
11. J. Fischer, R. Jhala, and R. Majumdar. Joining dataflow with predicates. SIG-
SOFT Softw. Eng. Notes, 30(5):227–236, 2005.
12. P. Godefroid, A. V. Nori, S. K. Rajamani, and S. D. Tetali. Compositional may-
must program analysis: Unleashing the power of alternation. SIGPLAN Not.,
45(1):43–56, 2010.
13. P. Granger. Improving the results of static analyses programs by local decreasing
iteration. In Proceedings of FSTTCS, pages 68–79. Springer-Verlag, 1992.
14. S. Gulwani and A. Tiwari. Combining abstract interpreters. SIGPLAN Not.,
41(6):376–386, 2006.
15. P. Jalote, V. Vangala, T. Singh, and P. Jain. Program partitioning: A framework
for combining static and dynamic analysis. In Proceedings of WODA, pages 11–16.
ACM, 2006.
16. J. C. King. Symbolic execution and program testing. Commun. ACM, 19(7):385–
394, 1976.
17. S. Lerner, D. Grove, and C. Chambers. Composing dataflow analyses and trans-
formations. SIGPLAN Not., 37(1):270–282, 2002.
18. K. Sen, D. Marinov, and G. Agha. Cute: A concolic unit testing engine for c.
SIGSOFT Softw. Eng. Notes, 30(5):263–272, 2005.
19. Y. Smaragdakis and Ch. Csallner. Combining static and dynamic reasoning for
bug detection. In Proceedings of TAP, pages 1–16. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
29
20. A. Toubhans, B.-Y. Chang, and X. Rival. Reduced product combination of ab-
stract domains for shapes. In Proceedings of VMCAI, volume 7737, pages 375–395.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
21. Apron. http://apron.cri.ensmp.fr/library.
22. Bugst. git://git.code.sf.net/p/bugst/src.
23. CPAchecker. http://cpachecker.sosy-lab.org.
24. Evaluation package. https://github.com/trtikm/aocbpa/releases/tag/v1.
0.
25. SMT-LIB. http://www.smt-lib.org.
26. SV-COMP. http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org.
27. Z3. https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3.
30
A Plots
Here we present data summarised in Fig. 4 and Fig 5 in a form of histograms.
They are automatically produced by the tool after evaluation (and then prettify
by our utility ’STATOR-tool/plotcopy.py’). Data in the mentioned figures were
collected from the histograms.
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B Access to the tool and Evaluation
The binary of the tool and all results of the evaluation are available here [24].
The binary can be run Linux 64 bit operating system. The tool was tested on
Linux Mint 17 and Debian 4.6.3. The binary also runs on Ubuntu 14.04.
Installation is very simple. Download the ZIP package, unzip it into some di-
rectory, and the tool is ready for an execution. The tool is located in STATOR-tool
sub-directory, the result from our evaluation in SVCOMP-repo.ORIG.EVAL sub-
directory. Note that SV-COMP benchmarks are not included in the package.
They have to be downloaded separately. All necessary info about this can be
found in Appendix C.
Use Python script STATOR-tool/start.py to run the tool on a single C file
you have to execute . Use the option --help to list detailed info of usage. In order
to run the evaluation for several benchmarks you have to execute Python script
STATOR-tool/start evaluation.py. Use the option --help to list detailed info
of usage. In all cases input C file(s) have to always be preprocessed.
In case you want to recompute results of our evaluation we prepared a ded-
icated shell script STATOR SVCOMP evaluate.sh located in the root directory
which calls STATOR-tool/start evaluation.py with our settings. Note the
shell script assumes that SV-COMP repository was cloned into sub-directory
SVCOMP-repo (which is empty in our package).
C List of Benchmarks
Here we list all benchmarks we used in evaluations. The list references to SV-
COMP 2015 [26] benchmark suite, revision 571.
Summary info:
– URL: https://svn.sosy-lab.org/software/sv-benchmarks/tags/svcomp15
– revision: 571
– Number of current benchmarks: 473
– Number of current directories: 48
• array-examples [10 benchmarks]
• bitvector [10 benchmarks]
• * bitvector-regression [9 benchmarks]
• ddv-machzwd [10 benchmarks]
• eca-rers2012 [10 benchmarks]
• float-benchs [10 benchmarks]
• floats-cbmc-regression [10 benchmarks]
• floats-cdfpl [10 benchmarks]
• * heap-manipulation [8 benchmarks]
• ldv-commit-tester [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-consumption [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-linux-3.0 [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-linux-3.12-rc1 [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-linux-3.16-rc1 [10 benchmarks]
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• ldv-linux-3.4-simple [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-linux-3.7.3 [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-regression [10 benchmarks]
• ldv-validator-v0.6 [10 benchmarks]
• list-ext-properties [10 benchmarks]
• list-properties [10 benchmarks]
• locks [10 benchmarks]
• loop-acceleration [10 benchmarks]
• loop-invgen [10 benchmarks]
• loop-lit [10 benchmarks]
• * loop-new [8 benchmarks]
• loops [10 benchmarks]
• memory-alloca [10 benchmarks]
• memsafety [10 benchmarks]
• * memsafety-ext [8 benchmarks]
• ntdrivers [10 benchmarks]
• ntdrivers-simplified [10 benchmarks]
• product-lines [10 benchmarks]
• pthread [10 benchmarks]
• pthread-atomic [10 benchmarks]
• pthread-ext [10 benchmarks]
• pthread-lit [10 benchmarks]
• pthread-wmm [10 benchmarks]
• recursive [10 benchmarks]
• recursive-simple [10 benchmarks]
• seq-mthreaded [10 benchmarks]
• seq-pthread [10 benchmarks]
• ssh [10 benchmarks]
• ssh-simplified [10 benchmarks]
• systemc [10 benchmarks]
• termination-crafted [10 benchmarks]
• termination-crafted-lit [10 benchmarks]
• termination-memory-alloca [10 benchmarks]
• termination-numeric [10 benchmarks]
List of benchmarks:
– ./array-examples/data structures set multi proc false-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/data structures set multi proc true-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/sanfoundry 24 true-unreach-call.i
– ./array-examples/sorting bubblesort false-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/standard compare true-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/standard copy2 true-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/standard init3 true-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/standard partition false-unreach-call ground.i
– ./array-examples/standard two index 08 true-unreach-call.i
– ./array-examples/standard vector difference true-unreach-call ground.i
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– ./bitvector-regression/implicitfloatconversion false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/implicitunsignedconversion false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/implicitunsignedconversion true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/integerpromotion false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/integerpromotion true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/signextension2 false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/signextension2 true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/signextension false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector-regression/signextension true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/byte add false-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/gcd 4 true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/interleave bits true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/jain 7 true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/modulus true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/num conversion 1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/parity true-unreach-call.i
– ./bitvector/s3 clnt 1 false-unreach-call.BV.c.cil.c
– ./bitvector/soft float 5 true-unreach-call.c.cil.c
– ./bitvector/sum02 true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd all false-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd inb p true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd inb true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd inl p true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd inl true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd inw p true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd outb false-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd outb p true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd outl true-unreach-call.i
– ./ddv-machzwd/ddv machzwd outw p true-unreach-call.i
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem01 label01 true-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem01 label03 true-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem01 label10 true-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem05 label48 false-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem10 label57 false-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem10 label58 false-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem11 label15 false-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem11 label18 true-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem19 label52 true-unreach-call.c
– ./eca-rers2012/Problem19 label59 false-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/float int inv square false-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/inv square int true-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/inv square true-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/nan double false-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/nan double union true-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/nan float mask true-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/nan float range true-unreach-call.c
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– ./float-benchs/nan float union true-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/sin interpolated index false-unreach-call.c
– ./float-benchs/sin interpolated smallrange true-unreach-call.c
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float-flags-simp1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float-no-simp1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float-no-simp2 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float-zero-sum1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float11 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float14 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float22 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float3 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float6 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cbmc-regression/float8 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/newton 1 4 false-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/newton 2 1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/newton 2 7 false-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/newton 3 8 false-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/sine 3 false-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/sine 4 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/sine 8 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/square 1 false-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/square 7 true-unreach-call.i
– ./floats-cdfpl/square 8 true-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/bubble sort linux false-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/bubble sort linux true-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/dll of dll false-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/dll of dll true-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/merge sort false-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/merge sort true-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/sll to dll rev false-unreach-call.i
– ./heap-manipulation/sll to dll rev true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 false-unreach-call drivers-media-radio-si4713-i2c-ko-
-111 1a--064368f-1.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 true-unreach-call drivers-hwmon-s3c-hwmon-ko--130 7a-
-af3071a.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 true-unreach-call drivers-media-video-cx88-cx88-blackbird-
ko--32 7a--d47b389.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 true-unreach-call drivers-media-video-cx88-cx88-dvb-
ko--32 7a--d47b389-1.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 true-unreach-call drivers-media-video-cx88-cx8802-ko-
-32 7a--d47b389.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/m0 true-unreach-call drivers-net-forcedeth-ko--114 1a--
fea891e-1.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/main2 true-unreach-call drivers-media-video-tlg2300-poseidon-
ko--32 7a--4a349aa.c
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– ./ldv-commit-tester/main3 true-unreach-call arch-x86-oprofile-oprofile-ko--131 1a-
-79db8ef.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/main4 true-unreach-call arch-x86-oprofile-oprofile-ko--131 1a-
-79db8ef-1.c
– ./ldv-commit-tester/main7 true-unreach-call sound-oss-sound-ko--32 7a--c4cb1dd-
1.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled false-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers-
-ata--libata.ko-ldv main4 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled false-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-fs--ceph-
-ceph.ko-ldv main11 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers-
-block--paride--pf.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers-
-block--paride--pt.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers-
-usb--host--xhci-hcd.ko-ldv main5 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-fs--nfs-
-nfsv4.ko-ldv main4 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-drivers--block-
-paride--pt.ko-main.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/32 7a cilled true-unreach-call linux-3.8-rc1-drivers--vfio--
pci--vfio-pci.ko-main.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers--media--usb--em28xx--em28xx.ko-
ldv main0 true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-consumption/linux-3.8-rc1-32 7a-drivers--usb--core--usbcore.ko-ldv main13 false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/module get put-drivers-atm-eni.ko true-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/module get put-drivers-block-drbd-drbd.ko true-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/module get put-drivers-net-ppp generic.ko false-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/module get put-drivers-net-wan-farsync.ko false-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-input-misc-keyspan remote.ko false-unreach-
call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-input-tablet-kbtab.ko true-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-media-dvb-ttusb-dec-ttusb dec.ko false-unreach-
call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-media-video-c-qcam.ko true-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-net-usb-catc.ko false-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.0/usb urb-drivers-vhost-vhost net.ko true-unreach-call.cil.out.i.pp.i
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--input--misc--ims-pcu.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--isdn--hisax--hisax st5481.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--media--rc--imon.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--media--usb--stk1160-
-stk1160.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
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– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--media--usb--usbvision-
-usbvision.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--net--can--usb--esd usb2.ko-
entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--net--usb--cdc mbim.ko-
entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--net--usb--smsc95xx.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--staging--gdm72xx--
gdmwm.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.12-rc1/linux-3.12-rc1.tar.xz-144 2a-drivers--usb--misc--idmouse.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/205 9a array unsafes linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-205 9a-drivers-
-net--wan--lapbether.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/205 9a array unsafes linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-205 9a-drivers-
-net--wireless--ath--ath6kl--ath6kl usb.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/205 9a array unsafes linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-205 9a-drivers-
-net--wireless--ath--wcn36xx--wcn36xx.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/205 9a array unsafes linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-205 9a-drivers-
-net--wireless--hostap--hostap plx.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--input-
-gameport--ns558.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--target-
-sbp--sbp target.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--tty-
-isicom.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--tty-
-serial--8250--8250.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--tty-
-serial--8250--8250 pci.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.16-rc1/43 2a consumption linux-3.16-rc1.tar.xz-43 2a-drivers--video-
-fbdev--via--viafb.ko-entry point true-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/32 1 cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-3.4-32 1-
drivers--acpi--bgrt.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/32 1 cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-3.4-32 1-
drivers--media--dvb--dvb-usb--dvb-usb-dibusb-mc.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/32 1 cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-3.4-32 1-
drivers--media--dvb--dvb-usb--dvb-usb-digitv.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-media--dvb--dvb-usb--dvb-usb-vp702x.ko-ldv main1 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-media--dvb--frontends--dib3000mc.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-media--video--gspca--gspca jl2005bcd.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-media--video--gspca--gspca pac207.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
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– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-media--video--gspca--gspca stv0680.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-watchdog--wdt pci.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.4-simple/43 1a cilled true-unreach-call ok nondet linux-43 1a-drivers-
-xen--xenfs--xenfs.ko-ldv main0 sequence infinite withcheck stateful.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/linux-3.10-rc1-43 1a-bitvector-drivers--atm--he.ko-ldv main0 true-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main0 false-unreach-call drivers--media--dvb-frontends--stv090x-
ko-–32 7a--linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main0 false-unreach-call drivers-net-wireless-mwl8k-ko-–32 7a-
-linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main11 false-unreach-call drivers-usb-core-usbcore-ko--32 7a-
-linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main15 false-unreach-call drivers-usb-core-usbcore-ko--32 7a-
-linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main17 false-unreach-call drivers-gpu-drm-vmwgfx-vmwgfx-
ko--32 7a--linux-3.5.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main1 false-unreach-call drivers-usb-core-usbcore-ko--32 7a-
-linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main1 false-unreach-call drivers-vhost-vhost net-ko--32 7a-
-linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main3 false-unreach-call drivers-gpu-drm-vmwgfx-vmwgfx-
ko--32 7a--linux-3.5.c
– ./ldv-linux-3.7.3/main4 false-unreach-call drivers-scsi-mpt2sas-mpt2sas-ko--
32 7a--linux-3.7.3.c
– ./ldv-regression/alias of return 2.c true-unreach-call 1.i
– ./ldv-regression/nested structure ptr true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/nested structure true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/sizeofparameters test.c true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/stateful check false-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/test address.c true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/test cut trace.c true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/test union cast.c true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-regression/test union cast.c true-unreach-call 1.i
– ./ldv-regression/volatile alias.c true-unreach-call.i
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-1575714-1-150 1a-drivers--net--wireless--b43-
-b43.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-1b0b0ac-1-108 1a-drivers--net--slip.ko-entry point false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-42f9f8d-1-111 1a-sound--oss--opl3.ko-entry point false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-431e8d4-1-102 1a-drivers--net--r8169.ko-entry point false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-4a349aa-1-32 7a-drivers--media--video--tlg2300-
-poseidon.ko-entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
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– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-4ed3cba-1-100 1a-drivers--usb--serial--qcserial.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-5934df9-1-111 1a-drivers--scsi--gdth.ko-entry point false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-90a4845-1-110 1a-drivers--char--ipmi--ipmi si.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-stable-c0cc359-104 1a-drivers--usb--serial--qcserial.ko-
entry point false-unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./ldv-validator-v0.6/linux-torvalds-645ef9e-32 7a-sound--oss--sound.ko-entry point false-
unreach-call.cil.out.c
– ./list-ext-properties/960521-1 1 false-valid-deref.i
– ./list-ext-properties/960521-1 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/list-ext 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/simple-ext 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0019 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0158 1 false-valid-free.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0214 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0232 1 false-valid-memtrack.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0232 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-ext-properties/test-0504 1 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./list-properties/alternating list true-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/list false-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/list flag false-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/list flag true-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/list search false-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/list search true-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/simple built from end true-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/simple false-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/simple true-unreach-call.i
– ./list-properties/splice false-unreach-call.i
– ./locks/test locks 10 true-unreach-call.c
– ./locks/test locks 11 true-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./locks/test locks 13 true-unreach-call.c
– ./locks/test locks 14 false-unreach-call.c
– ./locks/test locks 14 true-unreach-call.c
– ./locks/test locks 15 true-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./locks/test locks 5 true-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./locks/test locks 6 true-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./locks/test locks 8 true-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./locks/test locks 9 true-unreach-call.c
– ./loop-acceleration/array false-unreach-call2.i
– ./loop-acceleration/array false-unreach-call4.i
– ./loop-acceleration/diamond false-unreach-call2.i
– ./loop-acceleration/diamond true-unreach-call1.i
– ./loop-acceleration/diamond true-unreach-call2.i
– ./loop-acceleration/multivar true-unreach-call1.i
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– ./loop-acceleration/nested false-unreach-call1.i
– ./loop-acceleration/phases false-unreach-call2.i
– ./loop-acceleration/simple true-unreach-call4.i
– ./loop-acceleration/underapprox true-unreach-call2.i
– ./loop-invgen/NetBSD loop false-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/SpamAssassin-loop false-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/down true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/fragtest simple true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/half 2 true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/heapsort true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/id build true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/nested9 true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/seq true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-invgen/string concat-noarr true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-lit/afnp2014 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/cggmp2005 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/cggmp2005b true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/css2003 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/ddlm2013 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/gj2007b true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/gsv2008 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/jm2006 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/jm2006 variant true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-lit/mcmillan2006 true-unreach-call.c.i
– ./loop-new/count by 1 true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/count by 1 variant true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/count by 2 true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/count by k true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/count by nondet true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/gauss sum true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/half true-unreach-call.i
– ./loop-new/nested true-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/array false-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/insertion sort true-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/nec20 false-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/sum01 bug02 sum01 bug02 base.case false-unreach-call true-termination.i
– ./loops/terminator 02 false-unreach-call true-termination.i
– ./loops/terminator 03 true-unreach-call true-termination.i
– ./loops/trex03 false-unreach-call true-termination.i
– ./loops/veris.c OpenSER cases1 stripFullBoth arr true-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/vogal false-unreach-call.i
– ./loops/while infinite loop 2 true-unreach-call false-termination.i
– ./memory-alloca/HarrisLalNoriRajamani-2010SAS-Fig3-alloca true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memory-alloca/array02-alloca true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memory-alloca/cstrcmp-alloca true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memory-alloca/cstrcpy-alloca true-valid-memsafety.i
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– ./memory-alloca/cstrcpy unsafe false-valid-deref.i
– ./memory-alloca/cstrlen unsafe false-valid-deref.i
– ./memory-alloca/openbsd cstrcpy-alloca true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memory-alloca/reverse array alloca unsafe false-valid-deref.i
– ./memory-alloca/reverse array unsafe false-valid-deref.i
– ./memory-alloca/selection sort unsafe false-valid-deref.i
– ./memsafety-ext/dll extends pointer true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/skiplist 2lvl true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/skiplist 3lvl true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/tree cnstr true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/tree dsw true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/tree of cslls true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/tree parent ptr true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety-ext/tree stack true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety/960521-1 false-valid-free.i
– ./memsafety/lockfree-3.0 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety/lockfree-3.3 false-valid-memtrack.i
– ./memsafety/test-0019 false-valid-memtrack.i
– ./memsafety/test-0137 false-valid-deref.i
– ./memsafety/test-0158 false-valid-memtrack.i
– ./memsafety/test-0219 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety/test-0220 false-valid-memtrack.i
– ./memsafety/test-0236 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./memsafety/test-0504 true-valid-memsafety.i
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/cdaudio simpl1 false-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/cdaudio simpl1 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/diskperf simpl1 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/floppy simpl3 false-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/floppy simpl3 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/floppy simpl4 false-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/floppy simpl4 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/kbfiltr simpl1 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/kbfiltr simpl2 false-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers-simplified/kbfiltr simpl2 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/cdaudio false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/cdaudio true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/diskperf false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/diskperf true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/floppy2 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/floppy false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/floppy true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/kbfiltr false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/parport false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ntdrivers/parport true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./product-lines/elevator spec13 product21 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/email spec3 product19 false-unreach-call.cil.c
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– ./product-lines/email spec4 product17 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/email spec6 product15 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/email spec9 product21 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/minepump spec2 product34 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/minepump spec2 product38 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/minepump spec2 product60 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/minepump spec5 product20 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./product-lines/minepump spec5 product61 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./pthread-atomic/dekker true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/lamport true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/peterson true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/qrcu false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/qrcu true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/read write lock false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/read write lock true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/scull true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/szymanski true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-atomic/time var mutex true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/01 inc true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/04 incdec cas true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/05 tas true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/08 rand cas true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/18 read write lock true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/19 time var mutex true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/23 lu-fig2.fixed true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/25 stack longest true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/27 Boop simple vf false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-ext/30 Function Pointer3 vs true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/fk2012 true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/fkp2013 false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/fkp2013 true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/fkp2013 variant true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/fkp2014 true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/qw2004 false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/qw2004 true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/qw2004 variant true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/sssc12 true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-lit/sssc12 variant true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/mix000 power.oepc false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/mix008 pso.oepc false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/mix041 power.oepc false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/mix054 tso.opt false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/mix055 power.opt false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/rfi009 rmo.oepc false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/rfi009 rmo.opt false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/rfi009 tso.oepc false-unreach-call.i
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– ./pthread-wmm/safe037 tso.oepc true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread-wmm/thin002 pso.oepc true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/fib bench longer false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/fib bench longer true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/fib bench longest true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/queue longest false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/queue ok longer true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/queue ok longest true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/queue ok true-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/sigma false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/singleton false-unreach-call.i
– ./pthread/stateful01 false-unreach-call.i
– ./recursive-simple/afterrec 2calls false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/afterrec true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/fibo 2calls 2 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/fibo 2calls 5 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/id b5 o10 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/id i10 o10 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/id o10 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/id o200 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/sum 2x3 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive-simple/sum non true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/Ackermann03 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/Addition01 true-unreach-call true-termination.c
– ./recursive/Addition03 false-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/EvenOdd03 false-unreach-call false-termination.c
– ./recursive/Fibonacci01 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/Fibonacci02 true-unreach-call true-termination.c
– ./recursive/McCarthy91 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/Primes true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/gcd02 true-unreach-call.c
– ./recursive/recHanoi03 true-unreach-call true-termination.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals STARTPALS Triplicated true-unreach-call.ufo.BOUNDED-
10.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals floodmax.5 true-unreach-call.ufo.BOUNDED-10.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals lcr.7 true-unreach-call.ufo.UNBOUNDED.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals opt-floodmax.5 false-unreach-call.1.ufo.BOUNDED-10.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals opt-floodmax.5 false-unreach-call.1.ufo.UNBOUNDED.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/pals opt-floodmax.5 false-unreach-call.2.ufo.BOUNDED-10.pals.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/rekh ctm true-unreach-call.2.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/rekh ctm true-unreach-call.4.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/rekh nxt false-unreach-call.2.M4.c
– ./seq-mthreaded/rekh nxt true-unreach-call.3.M1.c
– ./seq-pthread/cs fib longer false-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs fib longer true-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs fib true-unreach-call.i
48
– ./seq-pthread/cs lamport true-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs peterson true-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs queue false-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs stack false-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs stateful false-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs sync true-unreach-call.i
– ./seq-pthread/cs szymanski true-unreach-call.i
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 clnt 1 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 clnt 2 true-unreach-call true-termination.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 clnt 4 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 clnt 4 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 11 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 14 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 1 false-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 1 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 4 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh-simplified/s3 srvr 6 true-unreach-call.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.01 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.02 false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.03 false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.04 false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.06 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.07 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.08 false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.10 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.12 true-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./ssh/s3 srvr.blast.13 false-unreach-call.i.cil.c
– ./systemc/kundu2 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/kundu true-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/pc sfifo 2 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/token ring.03 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/token ring.12 true-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/token ring.13 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/token ring.14 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/toy2 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/toy true-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./systemc/transmitter.12 false-unreach-call false-termination.cil.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/AliasDarteFeautrierGonnord-SAS2010-Fig2a true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/HeizmannHoenickeLeikePodelski-ATVA2013-Fig1 true-
termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/LarrazOliverasRodriguez-CarbonellRubio-FMCAD2013-
Fig1 true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/PodelskiRybalchenko-TACAS2011-Fig4 true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/PodelskiRybalchenko-VMCAI2004-Ex1 true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/Velroyen false-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/cstrcspn true-termination.c
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– ./termination-crafted-lit/cstrpbrk true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/cstrspn true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted-lit/gcd1 true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/4BitCounterPointer true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/Cairo true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/Copenhagen true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/NonTermination3 false-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/NonTermination4 false-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/NonTerminationSimple9 false-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/Parallel true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/Pure2Phase true-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/RecursiveNonterminating false-termination.c
– ./termination-crafted/Stockholm true-termination.c
– ./termination-memory-alloca/b.09 assume-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/b.10-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/b.13-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/cstrncat-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/java Break-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/java LogBuiltIn-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/java Nested-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/java Sequence-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/openbsd cbzero-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-memory-alloca/openbsd cstrcmp-alloca true-termination.c.i
– ./termination-numeric/Avg true true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/Binomial true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/Et1 true true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/Parts true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/TwoWay true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/b.03-no-inv assume true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/easySum true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/java LogBuiltIn true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/java Nested true-termination.c
– ./termination-numeric/rec counter1 true-termination.c
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